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A Note on the L-P Formulation of Zero-Sum 
Sequential Games with Incomplete Information 
Jean-Pierre Ponssard* 
Abstract 
Zero-sum games with incomplete information are 
formulated as linear programs in which the players' 
behavioral strategies appear as primal and dual 
variables. Known properties for these games may then 
be derived from duality theory. 
1. Introduction 
It has been known for long that any zero-sum game defined 
in normal form (i.e. by the payoff matrix) is equivalent to a 
linear program in which the variables represent the players' 
mixed strategies (Dantzig [I]). However, many games of 
interest are usually defined in extensive form (i.e. by the 
game tree), and then the exponential explosion of the number 
of pure strategies makes the normal form a pure theoretical tool 
inadequate for computational purposes. In the extensive form, 
the number of variables increases only linearly with respect to 
the number of information sets so that any computational 
procedure based on this representation is especially attractive. 
The objective of this note is to show that a s~ecial class 
of games defined in extensive form, namely zero-sum sequential 
games with incomplete information (Ponssard-Zamir 121 ), may 
indeed be directly formulated as linear programs in which the 
variables represent the players' behavioral strategies. Apart 
from its computational interest, a side product of this formula- 
tion is a new proof for the properties of these games. 
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2. Recall of the Definition of the Game 
The game essentially consists of four steps (a full 
description may be obtained in [ 2 ] ). 
step 0 Chance selects a move k~Il,-*.~Kl according 
0 to a probability distribution pE(~k : pk > 0; 
Step 1 Player 1 selects a move icilD*-* ,I} knowing k. 
Step 2 Player 2 selects a move j~{l,--*,J) knowing i 
but not k. 
Final Step Player 2 pays an amount ai to Player 1. k j 
is a real number) (VkDiDj : akj 
3. The L-P Formulation 
3.1 Definitions of the Variables 
For all k and i define Player 1's behavioral strategy by 
xk = Prob (move ilm0ve k) D i 
and his expected security level conditional on move i by ui. 
For all i and j define Player 2's behavioral strategy by 
yi = Prob (move j lmove i 
j 
and his expected security level conditional on move k by vk. 
3.2 Player 2's Problem 
subject to 
3.3 Player 1's Problem 
I 
Max X u i  
i=1 
subject to 
3.4 A Comment on the Size of the Problem 
Note that the dimensions of the matrix associated with 
these linear programs are (KxI+I) x (K+IxJ) as opposed to 
IK x J' if we were to "reduce" the game to its normal form. 
4. Property of the Value of the Game 
i Let the variables (Zkli = l,...,~; k = l,...,~ be defined 
as 
Then it is immediate that by this transformation, Player 1's 
problem is the dual of Player 2's problem (recall that for all 
0 k, pk > 0). Hence, denoting optimal values of the variables 
by a bar, we obtain from the duality theory 
Thus the game has a value which is equal to the optimal values 
of the objective functions. 
A property of this value is that it may be obtained from 
the concave hull of the value of an auxiliary game (see Theorem 
1, page 101 in [ 2 1). We shall now show that this property may 
be de r ived  d i r e c t l y  from our  L.P. formulat ion.  
L e t  u s  make a  change of  v a r i a b l e s  i n  Player  1's  problem. 
Define 
and l e t  t h e  new v a r i a b l e s  
be such t h a t  
i 
SO t h a t  pi = (pk lk  = l,... , K  i s  a  p o i n t  i n  P, and i f  X i  = 0, 
l e t  pi be a r b i t r a r y  i n  P. 
For a l l  p o i n t s  p  i n  P  and i = l , * * * , I ,  l e t  t h e  f u n c t i o n  
wi ( p )  be 
i 
w ( p )  = Min * i akjPk j  = 1 , * * * , J  k=l  
s o  t h a t  
i i  Xiw ( p  ) = Min i o k  = akjPkXi j = l , * * * , J  k=l  
Then P l a y e r  1's problem may be  w r i t t e n  a s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
n o n - l i n e a r  program: Find a  convex combinat ion  ( X i ) i  = l,...,I 
i 
and I p o i n t s  (P = 1,. . . , I  i n  P such  t h a t  
l i i  Max C Xiw ( p  ) 
i= 1 
s u b j e c t  t o  
L e t  w ( p )  d e n o t e  t h e  concave h u l l  o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n  w(p )  
d e f i n e d  a s  w (p)  = Max wi ( p )  . w ( p )  may b e  i n t e r p r e t e d  
i = l , * * . , I  
a s  t h e  v a l u e ,  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  of  p,  of  t h e  game i n  which P l a y e r  1 
moves w i t h o u t  knowing k  (see s t e p  2 i n  s e c t i o n  3 ) .  The o p t i m a l  
v a l u e  o f  t h i s  non- l inea r  program, and t h u s  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  
0 game, may t h e n  be  expres sed  a s  w ( p  ) .  
5. P r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  Optimal  S t r a t e g i e s  
The complementary s l a c k n e s s  c o n d i t i o n s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
t h e  two l i n e a r  programs g i v e  a t  t h e  optimum 
and 
-1 - i 0-k C y j ( u i -  C a  p x )  = O  , 
j=l k= 1 kj k i 
which,  combined t o g e t h e r ,  g i v e  
- i = I,.. .  - o-k 
,It  ui = k:lvkpkXi 
o r  i n  terms of t h e  new v a r i a b l e s  de f ined  i n  s e c t i o n  4 
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h i s  e q u a l i t y  i s  a s  fo l lows .  I f  
P layer  2 knew Player  1's opt imal  s t r a t e g y  , f o r  a l l  moves 
i which may occur  wi th  p o s i t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  (Xi > 01, he may 
compute a  p o s t e r i o r  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  on k  (pi) and 
s e l e c t  h i s  s t r a t e g y  s o  a s  t o  minimize P layer  1's  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
i -i 
c o n d i t i o n a l  on move i (w ( p  ) ) . On t h e  o t h e r  hand, P layer  2 ' s  
s e c u r i t y  l e v e l  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  h i s  opt imal  s t r a t e g y  and eva lua ted  
- -i 
a t  pi i s  I: vkpk. Thus, t h e  e q u a l i t y  is t h e  s p e c i a l  fo rmula t ion  
k= 1 
i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of t h i s  game of t h e  g e n e r a l  minimax s t a tement  
t h a t  P layer  2 cannot  b e n e f i t  from knowing P layer  1 ' s  opt imal  
s t r a t e g y .  
6. Example 
As an illustration, Player 2's linear program for the 
example presented in [ 2 1 with the specification that 
Min 1 2 TV1 + TV2 
s.t. 5 1 1 1 - 7Y1 + 2y2 
1 1 
v2 - lYl - l0y2 
1 
Y: + Y, 
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